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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to declare that a will executed by 
a woman who thereafter marries is revoked as a matter 
of law. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was heard by the court which granted a 
motion to dismiss contest of will. From orders dismissing 
contest of probate of will and admitting the will to pro-
bate, plaintiff-appellant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the orders dis-
missing the contest and admitting the will to probate and 
a determination in his favor, as a matter of law, that 
the contest was valid and the will was revoked. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Catharine Armstrong, a widow without issue, exe-
cuted a will on the 18th day of June, 1965 (J.R. 5). On 
the 29th day of January, 1967, she married LeRoy Mayo 
(J.R. 11). She died on the 24th day of July, 1967 (J.R.1). 
Petition for probate of her will was filed on the 4th 
day of August, 1967 (J.R. 1). Contest of probate of will 
was filed August 24, 1967 ( J .R. 11). Motion to dismiss 
contest was filed August 25, 1967 (J.R. 13). Order grant-
ing Motion to Dismiss contest was entered November 22, 
1967 (J.R. 24). The will was admitted to probate on 
November 21, 1967 (J.R. 20). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COMMON LAW THAT THE MARRIAGE OF A 
WOMAN REVOKED HER PRIOR EXISTING WILL IS STILL 
THE LAW OF UTAH. 
Section 68-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
"The common law of England so far as it is not 
repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitution 
or laws of the United States, or the constitution 
or laws of this state, and so far only as it is con-
sistent with and adapted to the natural and physi-
cal conditions of this state and the necessities of 
the people hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall 
be the rule of decision in all courts of this state." 
The fact that the will of a woman was revoked upon 
her subsequent marriage in common law, is not repug-
nant to, or in conflict with, the Constitution or laws of 
the United States or of this state and remains the law 
in Utah even if no statute were extant. There is nothing 
in such a rule that is inconsistent with the necessities 
of the people. 
In Thompson on Wills, 3rd E., p. 272, paragraph 
172 it provides: 
"172. Effect of subsequent marriage on will 
of a woman. . . The common-law rule that the 
marriage of a woman absolutely revoked her will 
was very generally adopted as the rule in this 
country. In many states the incapacity of a mar-
ried woman to make a will has been removed by 
statute, but few of such statutes make provisions 
for the effect of the marriage of a woman upon 
4 
her prior will. In most of the states where her 
incapacity to make a will has been removed, this 
removal of capacity has been determined to be in 
effect a removal of all the reasons of the common. 
law rule, and therefore to make the rule itself 
I 
obsolete, and to leave her antenuptial will in full ' 
force. (citing cases) But a majority of the courts, 
in jurisdictions where capacity to make a will 
has been removed by statute, still adhere to the 
common-law rnle that the will of a) feme sole is 
revoked by her subsequent marriage, where the 
statute makes no provision for such case. (citing 
cases" (Emphasis added.) 
The Utah statutes do not mention specifically the 
effect of marriage of a woman upon her prior will. The 
Utah legislature has enacted into statute the common-
law on revocation of a man's will. Section 74-1-24. It has 
also enacted into statute the common-law on revocation 
of a woman's will. See argument under Point III. All 
that the emancipation statute did was to remove the 
disability of a married woman. 
POINT II. 
THE APPEARANCE OF A NEW HEIR REVOKES PRO 
TANTO A PRIOR EXISTING WILL. 
At common-law the marriage of a woman automati· 
cally revoked her will. The marriage of a man alone did 
not revoke a will, but the birth of a child after making 
of a will, did revoke his will. The ratio decidendi behind 
the common-law rule was that the appearance of a new 
heir effected such a change of circumstances that a pre-
existing will would be revoked as a matter of law. All 
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the common law rules can be viewed from the point: 
"the appearance of a new heir not in contemplation on 
executing the will." The fact that a marriage was not 
sufficient to revoke a man's will was because under 
common-law a wife was not considered an heir of the 
husband. Under the emancipation statutes, a woman is 
given the same rights as a man. Although the common-
law, as such, may have been repealed in regard to a 
woman, the theory or basis of the common-law still ~p­
plies, and the appearance of a new heir is sufficient to 
revoke the will of either a man or woman. This, as far 
as the man is concerned, has been specifically adopted 
by statutes in Utah. The difference between the Utah 
statutes and the common-law rule on men is that in Utah 
we recognize as heirs some who were not such at com-
mon-law and revoke the will as to the new heirs. Many 
other states have also written into their statutes specifi-
cally the approach that the appearance of a new heir 
will revoke a will previously made, at least as to the 
new heir. In those states without statutes on the point 
of revocation, which have considered the matter, the 
appearance of a new heir automatically revokes the will. 
In re. Teopfer's Estate (N.M.) 78 P. 53. In this case a 
woman wrote her will devising all her property to her 
sister. Thereafter she married and died leaving surviv-
ing her a husband and no children. The will was declared 
void. The court stated: 
"By our laws ... if a husband or wife die, 
leaving no will and no children, the survivor shall 
inherit all of the property of the deceased ... 
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All of the states, so far as we have been able 
to discover, which hold that the marriage of a 
woman does not set aside a will made before 
such marriage, make such holding on the ground 
that the law amply provides for the survivor; but 
in those jurisdictions where the husband and wife 1 
are heir to each other, in the event of no children 
being born, the rule is generally held to be that 
marriage works such a change in the condition 
and circumstances of the testator as to revoke a 
will made prior to such marriage. It is presumed 
that the intent of the testator was that such a 
will should not take effect upon the happening 
of such a contingency. We do not think that the 
mere marriage of a woman would set aside her 
will, but it is the coming of a new heir; for under 
the laws of this territory, by marriage, not only 
does a man or woman get a wife or husband, but 
also an heir. vVe think that under the laws of 
this territory, by which the surviving spouse is 
the heir to the other in the event of no children 
being born of the marriage and no valid will 
being made during coverture, thf' common law is 
so altered that on marriage the ante-nuptial will 
of a husband would be set aside as well as that 
of his wife, and that both of them are now on the 
same footing. Marriage and the coming in of an 
heir to all the property works such a natural 
change in the testator's con<lition that it is not 
to be expected that the devise was made in view 
of such changed conditions ... 
'The English law rests on the firm founda-
tion that the birth of an heir who can inherit 
lands shall be held operative to destroy a will, 
because it is not to be conceived that the testator 
has devised his estate in view of such an extraor-
dinary alteration in his condition.' The same 
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principle and the same rule can be urged with like 
force in our own legislation, as stated by the 
English cases, and those which have followed the 
law which they announce. It is a strained con-
ception to assume that a man who has made a 
will while unmarried has made it in contempla-
tion of his assumption of the marriage relation ... 
It seems to us that in this territory this 
reasoning is equally ap_plicable whether the sur-
viving spouse be a man or woman. By the mar-
riage not only a husband or wife, but a new heir 
capable of inheriting all of the property, comes 
into existence; and in accordance with what we 
think is the spirit and reasoning of the doctrine 
and the purpose and meaning of our laws, we 
hold that the marriage of a testator, whether or 
not it be followed by birth of an heir, is oper-
ative to revoke any ante-nuptial will." 
The Teopfer case was cited with approval in In 
re. Lewis' Will, 71 P.2d 1032 (1937), in which the same 
court recently stated: 
"It is, that by marriage in the territory, the 
testator not only acquired a new spouse but a 
new heir, which so changed his or her condition 
and circumstances that it created a presumption 
of the testator's intention that the will should be 
revoked upon the happening of such contingency. 
That, as under the territorial statutes the law of 
property and inheritances made no distinction be-
tween the rights of husbands and wives, the rea-
son for the common law distinction had disap-
peared ... 
"Under the laws of New Mexico, the husband 
and wife, as to property rights and inheritances 
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(except as to community property) are placed in 
identi:ally th~ same sitHation. Upon marriage 
each 1s an heir to the other. The effect of the 
rule adopted in the Teo pf er case is that a will 
made prior to marriage by either husband or 
wife is revoked by marriage because of the advent 
of a new heir who is entitled to share in the 
property of the other upon his or her decease. It 
operates the same whether the testator is a lms-
band or wife." 
In the case of Dnrfee 1'-'· Risch, 142 Mich. 504, 105 
N.W. 1114, the testatrix, being unmarried, made a will, 
then married and had ont> child who survived. Women 
in Michigan at that time were emancipated and there 
was no statute which mentioned the effect upon a wo-
man's will of her subsPquent marriage and bearing of 
a child. The court held that the will was rt>voked on 
the theory that a new heir had appeared and stated, 
after discussing the common-law rule that marriage re-
voked a will : 
"Where, as in this state, the reason for this 
rule fails, the rule fails. It does not follow, how-
ever, because the marriage alone does not revoke 
the will, that marriage and birth of issue do not. 
The abrogation of this rule places the male and 
the female on the same plane as to this; i.e., that 
the subsequent marriage does not of itself revokr 
the will. But it is illogical to say, because the 
existence of a more restricted rule to the wills 
of females prevented the application of the gen-
eral rule of the common law, that such rule should 
not be applied to male and female alike, when the 
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removal of the latter's disability makes the gen-
eral rule applicable ... In Noyes vs. Southworth, 
supra, we said: 'Our constitution has done away 
with all disabilities of coverture, and expressly 
authorized every married woman to make wills 
of her estate as if she were sole. This leaves her 
case to be governed by the same rule which would 
apply to any one else on change of condition.'" 
2 Page on Wills, Bowe Parker Revision at page 517 
states: 
"In many states, statutes are in force which 
provide that a married woman has capacity to 
make a will and that, under certain specified cir-
cumstances, the husband may be the heir of his 
wife. The corresponding provision that the wife 
may be the heir of the husband has been held, in 
many states, to abolish the common law rule that 
the marriage of a man does not, of itself, revoke 
his will; and such marriage has been held to re-
voke his will on the theory that, under the statute, 
the marriage has at once brought into existence 
a new heir, whose existence was not fairly within 
the contemplation of testator when he made his 
will. If such a statute abolishes the common-law 
rule with reference to the marriage of a man, it 
would seem that it ought to keep alive the com-
mon-law rule that the marriage of a woman re-
vokes her will, even though the legislature has by 
another statute given a married woman the ca-
paci ty to make a will." 
The husband is made an heir of his wife in the 
state of Utah by virtue of Section 74-4-5, UCA 1953. 
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POINT III. 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES CAUSE 
THE REVOCATION OF A WILL OF A WOMAN UPON HER 
MARRIAGE. 
Utah has two constitutional prov1s10ns which are 
applicable to the case at bar. Article IV, Section 1 of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah provides: 
"The rights of citizens of the State of Utah 
to vote and hold office shall not be denied or 
abridged on account of sex. Both male and fe-
male citizens of this state shall enjoy equally all 
civil, political and religious rights and privileges." 
Article XXII, Section 2 of the Constitution provides: 
"Real and personal estate of every female, 
acquired before marriage, and all property to 
which she may afterwards become entitled by 
purchase, gift, grant, inheritance or devise, shall 
be and remain the estate and property of such 
female, and shall not be liable for the debts, 
obligations or engagements of her husband, and 
may be conveyed, devised or bequeathed by her 
as if she were unmarried." 
This last provision of the Constitution has been in-
terpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in In re. Peter-
sen's Estate, Petersen vs. Parry, 97 Utah 325, 93 P.2d 
445, in a decision written by Mr. Justice McDonough and 
concurred in unanimously by the balance of the court. 
This was a case in which a wife made a will leaving her 
property to her sister and in substance disinheriting her 
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husband. The husband demanded the homestead right 
and various items of personal property which would be 
exempt from execution. The court held for the husband 
in the case and Mr. Justice McDonough, in discussing 
the above mentioned constitutional provision, stated: 
"This means that she may deal with her prop-
erty in the respects enumerated, as she might 
deal with it at common law were there not disa-
bilities in the wife and estate vested in the hus-
band by reasons of marriage ... 
Looking at the provision against its common 
law background, there is nothing in its wording 
which evidences an intention upon the part of its 
authors to go further and inhibit the Legislature 
from placing upon the right to devise the limi-
tation here in question. Its evident aim was to 
bring about equality not inequality between the 
parties to a marriage contract. . . 
We adhere to the position that the constitu-
tion of this state effects equality between hus-
band and wife insofar as disposing of his or he1· 
separate property by will is concerned, and hence 
the statute reserving to the survivor of either a 
homestead is not in contravention of the consti-
tution." (Emphasis added.) 
In the light of this case's interpretation of the con-
stitution, it is necessary that all statutes dealing with 
the devise or bequest of property must be interpreted 
as applying equally to men and women. This interpre-
tation is reemphasized by the provision of the consti-
tution quoted above of Article IV, Section 1, which states 
12 
that both male and female citizen::; of this state shall 
enjoy equally all civil rights and privileges. 
2 Page on -Wills, Bowe Parker Revision 515 : 
"The rule that marriage revokes the will of 
a vrnman has been enacted in many states. If it 
is expressly provided by statute that marriage of 
a man revokes his will, and if, by the provisions 
of another statute or by the general principles 
of statutory construction, words of the masculine 
gender are to be regarded as including the f emi-
nine gender, the marriage of a woman will also 
operate as a revocation of her will." 
Section 68-3-12 UCA 1953, the Construction Statute, 
says: 
"In the construction of these statutes the fol-
lowing rules shall be observed, unless such con-
struction would be inconsistent with the manifest 
intent of the legislature or repugnant to the con-
text of the statute: 
(7) -Words used in one gender comprehend 
the other." 
There are several cases interpreting the effect of 
such a statute upon probate statutes. A case applying 
the above rule is the Estate of Stark, 52 Ariz. 416, 82 
Pac. 2nd 894. The statutes in that case provide that the 
will of a man was revoked by subsequent marriage, were 
silent as to the revocation of the will of a woman by 
her subsequent marriage. By another statute providing 
that wherever the statute used the "masculine" gender, 
13 
the "feminine" gender would also apply, added to the 
fact that in Arizona a man and woman had been made 
equal by the emancipation statute, a woman's will, by 
implication, was revoked by her subsequent marriage. 
In the case of Parker vs. Swain, Tex. 223 S.W. 231, 
Mrs. Swain executed a will. Twelve months thereafter 
a new child was born. The question as to the validity of 
the will was before the court. The Texas statute pro-
vides: 
"If a testator having a child or children born 
at the time of making his last will and testament, 
shall, at his death, leave a child ... born after 
the making of such last will and testament, the 
child or children so afterborn and pretermitted 
shall, unless provided for by settlement, succeed 
to the same portion of the father's estate as they 
would have been entitled to if the father had died 
intestate ... " 
It was claimed, as it is in the case at bar, that be-
cause the statute did not mention "testatrix" but specifi-
cally refers to wills made by testators and mentioned the 
word "father," that such statute had no bearing upon 
the mother's will. A married woman was authorized by 
the laws of the state of Texas to dispose of her estate 
by will. Texas also had the provision of a statute pro-
viding: 
"The following rule shall govern in the con-
struction of all civil statutory enactments. . . 
The masculine gender shall include the feminine 
and neuter." 
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The court held that the statute applied to the moth. 
er's will, and that it was revoked as to the pretermitted 
child, and used this language : 
" 'We think the true interpretation of our 
statute is that in testing and determining whether 
the unborn child is mentioned in the will, the 
language of the testator, (testatrix in this case) 
should be construed and considered with refer-
ence to the situation and facts within his knowl-
edge, and having in mind the considerations on 
which and with reference to which he was then 
acting.' Judge Ramsey seems to assume that the 
statute is applicable to wills made by either the 
father or mother of afterborn child. The authori-
ties are not in perfect accord upon the question. 
A similar statute, under a state of facts such as 
we have in this case, was discussed by the Su-
preme Court of Georgia in Ellis vs. Darden, 86 
Ga. 368, 12 SE 652, 11 LRA 51. The conclusion 
was reached that the word "testator" also in-
cluded "testatrix." To the same effect is Durfee 
vs. Risch, 142 Mich. 504, 105 NW 1114 ... In the 
light of these cases, which are sustained by the 
weight of authority, we think the judgment should 
be affirmed, and it is accordingly so ordered af-
firmed." 
In the case of Ellis vs. Darden, Ga. 12 SE 652, the 
Georgia court said: 
"In construing the Code, it is necessary to 
bear in mind section 4 which declares that 'The 
masculine gender shall include the feminine.' 
Nothing can be more manifest than that this rule 
was intended to apply to the provisions of the 
15 
Code on the subject of wills ... From the first to 
the last of these sections on wills, with few, if 
any exceptions, the masculine includes the femi-
nine. . . It cannot be doubted that in many of 
the sections the word 'testator' includes testatrix. 
As to most of the sections in which the word oc-
curs, no other construction is possible ... Section 
2477 reads: 'In all cases the marriage of the tes-
tator or the birth of a child to him, subsequent 
to the making of a will in which no provision is 
made in contemplation of such an event, shall be 
a revocation of the will.' We can have no reason-
able doubt that the rule that the masculine in-
cludes the feminine applies to this section as well 
as to so many others touching the subject of wills, 
and consequently that in sense and meaning it 
has the same scope as if it read thus: 'In all 
cases the marriage of the testator or testatrix or 
the birth of a child to him or her, subsequent to 
the making of a will in which no provision is made 
in contemplation of such an event, shall be a 
revocation of the will. . . The act of 1834 put a 
man's will, in this respect, upon the footing of 
a woman's, with an implied saving in favor of 
wills in which provision was made for the pros-
pective wife. It also made the birth of a child 
operate as a revocation of any prior will in which 
the child was not provided for. Then came the 
code, in 1863 and after varying the phraseology 
of the act of 1834 so as to make it wider and 
more general, incorporated its principle of revo-
cation into the legal system of wills, with an im-
plied saving in favor of wills in which, not the 
wife or the child, but the event of marriage or 
the birth of a child was provided for ... 
We can be sure, at any rate, that the code 
nowhere declares that the will of a woman is not 
16 
revoked by marriage or by the birth of a child. 
Thus no contradiction is involved in our construc-
tion of section 2477 ... 
A man may bequeath his entire estate to 
strangers. . . All legal rights of the wife and 
family, such as dower and a year's support, arP 
as secure against a will made at one time as at 
another. The object of the provision is to secure 
a specific moral influence upon the testamentary 
act, the moral influence of having before the mind 
a contingent event so momentous as marriage or 
the birth of a child, and so deserving of consider-
ation in framing a testamentary scheme. A pub-
lic policy which rejects the will of a prospective 
husband or father because it affords no evi-
dence of the presence of this influence may well 
reject that of a prospective wife or mother for 
the same reason ... There is as much reason in 
re4uiring one as the other to furnish evidence 
in the \viJl itself that the testamentary act was 
performed with the future event of marriage or 
birth of a child in actual and present contempla-
tion. Now that women, ... have substantially the 
same testamentary freedom as men, the wills of 
both sexes made before or after marriage ought 
to stand on the same footing . . . the harmony 
of the whole testamf'ntary system will be better 
preserved by treating the wills of both sexes 
alike. When the woman's rights touching the dis-
position of property are those of a man, her disa-
bilities should also be those of a man ... In order 
to save a will from revocation by subsequent mar-
riage, the will itself must contain the requisite 
evidence that the event was contemplated. At 
least, such evidence must appear on the face of 
some document offered for probate as part of 
a will." 
.o 
'P 
lt 
·e 
y 
d 
1]' 
r-
l-
·e 
I· 
u 
n 
:e 
,s 
,y 
l-
e 
,f 
1\ 
y 
:S 
i-
l-
r 
·-
e 
t 
f 
f 
17 
In the case of Owens vs. Haines, 199 Penn. 137, 48 
Atl. 859, a woman was the owner of real estate and 
was married. She executed her will giving her entire 
estate to her husband. After <"xecntion of the will, their 
only child, Florence, was born and the mother died. The 
child claims the property as against the father by the 
laws of intestacy as to her. P(:'nnsylvania statutes pro-
vide: 
"When any person shall make his last will 
and testament and afterwards shall marry or have 
a child or children not provided for in such will, 
and die, leaving a widow and child or either a 
widow or child or children although such child or 
children be born after the death of their father, 
every such person, so far as shall regard the 
widow, or child or children after born, shall be 
deemed and construed to die intestate; and such 
widow, child or children, shall be entitled to such 
purports, shares and dividends of the estate ... 
of the deceased, as if he had actually died with-
out any will." 
The claim was made that since the statute provides 
only for the death of a man, under such circumstances, 
and said nothing about the woman, that it did not apply 
to the will of the woman. The court, however, held that 
it did apply to the will of the woman and stated: 
"The objection is made by the appellant that 
the act applies only to the wills of males, and not 
to those of females. This is technical and unrea-
sonable. In the reasonable interpretation of stat-
utes, the words "he," "his," and "him" have re-
peatedly been held to include women as well as 
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men; and the word "any person," in this act, even 
if followed by "his," "widow," "father," and "a~ 
if he had acntally died without any will," must 
in the case of a testatrix, be read as if they wer~ 
followed by "her," "widower," "mother," and "as 
if she had actually died without any will." 
In the case of Walker vs. Hyland, 56 A. 268 (NJ 1903) 
a married woman died. The revocation statutes read 
only in the male sex. Held that it applied to females 
as well. The court stated that by virtue of the statutes: 
" ... a married woman in this state may make 
a will devising her real estate in the same man-
ner as she might if she were unmarried ... That 
any will or testament hereafter made in due form 
of law by any married woman above the age of 
21 ... shall be held to be as valid and effectual 
in law as if she were ... an unmarried woman ... 
The 21st section of the act re. Wills of 1846 
reads: ' ... That if a testator having a child or 
children born at the time of making and pub-
lishing such last will and testament, shall at his 
death, leave a child or children born after the 
making and publishing of said last will or any 
descendant of such after born child ... if neither 
provided for by settlement nor disinherited by 
said testator, shall succeed to the same portion 
of the father's estate, as such child ... would 
have been entitled to if the father had died intes-
tate; ... " 
Defendant contended that the statute by its terms 
is confined to the case of a married man and a father 
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and this intentionally so, for at the time it was passed 
no married woman could make a will. 
"The method for the execution of a will was 
provided for by the act of 1851 ... was a supple-
ment to the act of 1846. It was never questioned 
between 1852, when the act was passed permitting 
a married woman to make a will, and the re-
enactment of the act of 1851 by the revision of 
1874 that the provisions of the act of 1851 applied 
to the execution of a will by a married woman. 
Yet section 1 of the act of 1851 uses the word 
'testator' only. But it is clear that the word 'tes-
tator' applies to testatrix irrespective of our act 
eoncerning statutes, because 'testatrix' as Web-
ser defines it, means 'a female testator.' We 
should have no hesitation in construing testator 
to include testatrix if we possessed no act for 
the construction of statutes. 
• • • 
Statutes must be construed reasonably, that 
they may be given their self evident legislative 
intent. vVhen the Legislature conferred the power 
upon a married woman to make a will, and failed 
to provide any specific method therefor, that 
necessarily carried with it the right to execute 
the instrument and devise property thereunder 
as other persons might lawfully do. The right 
to devise property was also subject to the limi-
tations imposed upon other natural persons in 
making such a devise. 
Nor do we see any force in the contention 
that, because section 21 of the act uses the word 
'father' for that reason an after born child of 
the 'mother' dying tPstate, would not succeed to 
any portion of the mother's estate. Speaking for 
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myself alone, if I were compelled to determine 
this case upon the words of the 21st section of 
the act concerning wills, only, I should feel it 
was a matter of construction, not legislation, as 
the defendants contend, to hold that since 1852 
the word 'father' in this statute, must be givrn 
no more force than 'testator' or 'testatrix' and 
that it applied to either ... 
With that section gone, and the power given 
to a married woman to make a will, she took that 
power subject to all the limitations contained in 
the act as to other testators similarly situated, 
and with the further limitation contained in the 
proviso of section 9 of the married woman's act 
as to her husband's estate by the curtesy. 
But if the construction just suggested cannot 
be sustained, still will we all agree that the word 
father, as used in the 21st section of the act con-
cerning wills should be held to apply to mother, 
by virtue of the 9th section of an act relative to 
statutes ... that whenever, in describing or re-
ferring to any person, party, matter or thing, any 
word importing the singular number or masculine 
gender is used in any statute, the same shall be 
understood to include, and shall apply to several 
persons and parties, as well as one person or 
party, and females as well as males and bodies 
corporate as well as individuals and several mat-
ters and things as well as one matter or thing, 
unless it be otherwise provided, or there be some 
thing in the subject or context repugnant to such 
construction. . . It declares that the masculine 
gender, when used in any statute, shall include 
females as well as males. It cannot be said that 
father, as used in the 21st section of the act, does 
not relate to males; and, if that be conceded, how 
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can it be said that 'mother' which relates to fe-
males, is not embraced in the statute? ... The 
result here reached is consonant with justice. To 
have reached any other conclusion would have 
compelled us to do violence not only to the law, 
but to our natural instinct of humanity." 
We are now faced with the statutes of the state 
which are applicable to this case. Section 74-1-3 provides: 
"A married woman may dispose of all her 
estate by will without the consent of her husband, 
and may alter or revoke her will in the same 
manner as if she were single. Her will must be 
executed and proved in the same manner as other 
wills." 
This statute merely abolishes the common law re-
striction upon the rights of married women to make a 
will, and as such, is in support of our constitutional pro-
visions providing for equality between the sexes. 
There are four provisions in the Utah statutes which 
deal with revocation of a will by law. The sections are: 
74-1-24. Effect of marriage, (JJYl,d issue after 
making will. If after making a will the testator 
marries and has issue of such marriage born 
either in his life time or after his death, and the 
wife or issue survives him, the will is conclusively 
presumed to be revoked, unless provision is made 
for such issue bv some settlement, or unless such 
issue is provided for in the will, or in such way 
mentioned therein as to show an intention not to 
make such provision ; and no evidence of other 
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facts to rebut the presumption of such revocation 
can be received. 
74-1-25. Eff Pct of marriage, if wife survives. 
If after making a will the testator marries and thr 
wife survives him, the will is conclusively pn-
sumed to be revoked, unless provision has been 
made for ht:~r either by marriage contract, or by 
some written settlement showing on its face th1· 
testator's intention to substitute such contract or 
settlement for a provision in her favor in his will, 
or unless she is provided for in the will or in 
such provision; and no evidence of other facts 
to rebut the presumption of revocation can be 
received. 
74-1-31. Child born after making will. When 
a testator has a child born either in his lifetime or 
after his death, or adopted, after the making of 
his will, and dies leaving such child unprovided 
for by any settlement, and neither provided for 
nor in any way mentioned in his will, the child 
succeeds to the same portion of the testator's 
real and personal property that he would have 
succeeded to if the testator had died intestate. 
74-1-32. Failure to provide for child or child's 
issue. When any testator omits to provide in his 
will for any of his children, natural or adopte~, 
or for the issue of any deceased child, unless it 
appears that such omission was intentional, such 
child or the issue of such child has the same share 
in the estate of the testator as if he had died 
intestate, and succeeds thereto as provided in thr 
preceding section." 
The theory of the plaintiff-appellant is that these 
four sections apply to a woman as well as to a man, 
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in light of the foregoing cases, and particularly so m 
light of Section 68-3-12 (7). 
If the word "testator" in Section 74-1-24, does not 
mean the woman as well as the man who dies, a single 
woman could make a will leaving everything to a third 
party, thereafter marry, have two children and die with-
out changing her will and her children and husband 
would be disinherited. This can only be avoided by 
having the word "testator" mean also "testatrix." Web-
ster and Black's Law Dictionary define "testatrix" as 
"a female testator," so the word "testator" includes both 
male and female. 
Under Section 74-1-31, if the word "testator" does 
not mean a woman as well as a man, a married woman 
can make a will, leave her estate to her surviving child, 
thereafter have another child, and if she fails to make 
a new will, the new child is disinherited; also, under the 
same section a married woman can make a will, die at 
childbirth, have the baby delivered after death, and al-
though she might like to change her will, it would be 
impossible and the baby would be disinherited. 
Under Section 74-1-32 a man may not accidently 
disinherit a child. If the word "testator" in this section 
does not apply to a woman, as well as a man, a woman 
may accidently disinherit a child. The writers can con-
ceive of no reason why a woman should be permitted 
accidently to disinherit her child, when a man may not 
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vVe now come to Section 7 4-1-25, which is the spe. 
cific section which may control the issue before the 
court. This section is written in the masculine only, 
but by virtue of Section 68-3-12 (7) should read: "If 
after making a will the testatrix marries and the hus-
band survives her, the will is presumed to be revoked, 
unless ... " 
If the above statutes mean "male" only, they are 
unconstitutional. To be constitutional they must be in-
terpreted to mean both sexes. A basic rule of construc-
tion is that a statute must be construed, if at all possible, 
m a manner that makes the statute constitutional. 
rrhe position of plaintiff-appellant is that the Utah 
Constitution states that a man and woman are equal in 
regard to testamentary dispositions, and its interpreta-
tion in In re. Petersen's Estate (supra) makes it man-
datory that all of the four Utah statutes in regard to 
revocation of wills, by implication, be read in both the 
masculine and feminine genders. The Utah Constitution 
in the case of In re. Petersen and Section 68-3-12 (7) 
merely reaffirmed and put a constitutional basis under 
the theories used by the courts heretofore cited, in plac-
ing men and women on exactly the same footing, and 
in interpreting that any statutes dealing with revoca· 
tion of wills applies equally to men and to women and 
should be so read. 
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CONCLUSION 
The united Utah Court held in Mower's Estate, 93 
U. 390, 73 P.2d 967, that it was desirable and impera-
tive that the statutes on descents and distribution be 
"a unified whole, each provision fitting into the gen-
eral plan for protection of the family unit, and depen-
dent spouse and minor children, in accordance with the 
constitution, legislature, history and policy ... " In re. 
Petersen (supra) implemented this public policy. 
If this court reverses the probate of the instant 
11ill, the statutes and constitution of Utah will be made 
clear, unified, fair and workable. Now that the matter 
has come to this court's attention, any decision to the 
contrary will create havoc and inequities. The will must 
not be permitted to be probated, and this court should 
reverse the lower court. 
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